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Abstract
This reflection contrasts the dominant imaginary underlying ‘law of the Anthro-
pocene’ with an imaginary reaching towards ‘law/s for the Anthropocene’. It does 
so primarily by contrasting two imaginaries of human embodiment—law’s exist-
ing imaginary of quasi-disembodiment and an alternative imaginary of embodi-
ment as co-woven with the lively incipiencies and tendencies of matter. It draws on 
‘transcorporeality’ and ‘sympoiesis’ as inspiration for ‘sympoietic normativities’ as 
ways of co-living and co-organizing in the face of the catastrophic implications of 
the Anthropocene emergency.
Keywords Anthropocene · Colonial capitalism · Embodiment/disembodiment · 
Imaginaries · Lively matter · Sympoiesis · Sympoietic normativities · 
Transcorporeality
Imaginaries: Bodies and Worlds
Opening her 2004 article, ‘Imaginary bodies and worlds’, Lennon states that her 
aim is ‘to distil a concept of the imaginary with which to make good the claim 
that our mode of embodied subjectivity is an imaginary embodiment in an imagi-
nary world’ (Lennon 2004, p. 107). The imaginary, thus understood, is not a con-
cept existing at one side of a real/imaginary binary: rather, the imaginary is a 
conditional requirement of there being a ‘real’ to exist ‘for us’ at all (2004, p. 
112). Accordingly, displacing/replacing an existing imaginary must necessarily 
always be more than ‘a matter of appealing to considerations of truth or falsity. 
It involves encounters with alternative imagined configurations which can be 
recognized as making both cognitive and affective sense’ (2004, pp. 107; 111). 
It means creating, in short, a new body-world—a reimagined, liveable way of 
going-on-corporeally-in-the-world.
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Imaginaries are socially distributed, phenomenologically potent cognitive-
affective structures that constitute subjectivity—‘affectively laden thought pat-
terns’ (2004, p. 113, citing Gatens and Lloyd 1999, p. 5) ‘constitutively linked to 
different practices and ways of life’ (2004, p. 115). Gatens and Lloyd argue that
The social imaginary is constitutive of, not merely reflective of, the forms 
of sociability in which we live. The imaginary endures through time and so 
becomes increasingly embedded in all our institutions, our judicial systems, 
our national narratives, our founding fictions, our cultural traditions. (Gat-
ens and Lloyd 1999, p. 143)
Law—itself a powerful imaginary—is necessarily enmeshed in assemblages reflect-
ing the materio-semiotic affects (and affectivity) of institutional, constitutional, 
historical, national and international narratives, architectures, bodies of text, con-
ceptual formations, patterns of coercion and facilitation and other modes of norma-
tive organization and juridical praxis. Central to law’s imaginary, in the liberal legal 
tradition, is the potent founding fiction of the liberal social contract, folded into the 
foundations of which is a highly particular subject—a specific kind of person—the 
‘man of property/classic contractor’ (Naffine 2001, p. 56). Importantly, this sub-
ject’s imaginary embodiment is also of a specific kind: it is complexly disembodied 
(Ahmed 1995; Grear 2010; 2015). This imaginary disembodiment is foundational to 
the rationality thought to define this subject (the quintessential ‘rational subject’) for 
whom/which everything else (including the human body itself) functions as ‘object’.
Lennon argues that ‘our mode of embodied subjectivity is an imaginary 
embodiment in an imaginary world’ and that ‘The imaginary form of our world 
is, therefore, interdependent with the imaginary forms of our own embodiment’ 
(Lennon 2004, pp. 114–115).
It is here, in the interdependence between imaginary embodiment and the 
imaginary form of the world that there is an important inflection point for the 
development of a legal imaginary for the Anthropocene. The basic proposal is 
this: if the existing imaginary of law is interdependent with an imaginary dis-
embodiment, then an alternative legal imaginary can emerge from an alternative 
imaginary of (re-)embodiment. It is this alternative imaginary, and its implica-
tions for an alternative legal imaginary, in which this paper is interested.
The paper first introduces law’s quasi-disembodied imaginary of ‘human’ embod-
iment, linking this to the legal imaginary of the Anthropocene. After that, the analy-
sis turns towards a legal imaginary for the Anthropocene by constructing an alterna-
tive imaginary of human embodiment drawing on broadly new materialist ideas.
Legal Imaginary of the Anthropocene
It follows from Lennon’s argument that law’s imaginary world is interdependent 
with law’s imaginary of human embodiment. However, as noted above, this embodi-
ment is a (complex) form of disembodied-embodiment—or ‘quasi-disembodiment’ 
(Grear 2010, pp. 41–45).
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A range of critical legal scholarship converges to expose the centrality to legal 
ideology of this disembodied capitalistic subject, but—significantly—its structural 
disembodiment is never complete. Disembodiment is, in effect, a mystification 
based upon the long-standing onto-epistemic binary underwriting the imaginary of 
the body in much Western philosophy (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and serves a dis-
tinctive ideological function in the legal system.1 Disembodiment and the decon-
textualized, dis-embedded rationality it elevates produces the uneven (but predict-
ably patterned) suppression of the full legal significance of human materiality and 
embodiment (Cheah et al. 1996, p. xv), while prioritizing a highly particular, histori-
cally dominant, identifiable beneficiary: the paradigmatic European property-own-
ing male citizen (Naffine 1997, 2001, p. 56).
It is this subject who uniquely possesses reason, the reason thought to ‘transcend 
the structures of bodily experience’ (Johnson 1987, p. x). The body is thus sepa-
rated from the ‘rational mind’, and reduced to an ‘object to be controlled and mecha-
nised’ (Seidler 1998, p. 17), while the moral agent of law is likewise quintessentially 
defined by its possession of abstract, rationalistic universal characteristics that tran-
scend embodiment (Halewood 1996).
Disembodiment and its interdependent form of objectifying rationality are foun-
dational to law’s concept of the legal actor, the person. The disembodied-body of 
law is a complex but reductively conceived container for a rational, calculative will 
and performs a politics of excision by which law’s subject stands on one side of 
law’s central binary opposition between person and property. Law’s imaginary of 
the body necessarily thus performs a radical ‘decontextualisation of the subject from 
the world of objects…’ (1996, p. 1340). Accordingly, law’s imaginary of disembodi-
ment converges with law’s imaginary world as object—mere extensa—a field for the 
action of the only subject whose agency ever truly counts.
Law’s imaginary also constructs the body itself as object in multiple, intersecting 
and disaggregated ways. The body is the corporeal boundary of the quintessential 
holders of legal rights (1996, p. 1341), while the body is also disaggregated vari-
ously as the ‘legal penis’, the ‘legal vagina’ and a whole host of other legal body 
parts performing specific ideological roles in the legal imaginary (Hyde 1997). 
Meanwhile, ‘bodily identity’ forms the substrate for an entire spectrum of legal 
privileges and marginalizations based on highly selective readings of corporeality 
through which rational, property-owning white European males are privileged while 
all ‘others’ are complexly marginalized—unable to function as full legal persons as 
those others, based precisely upon their corporeal ‘otherness’ (Naffine 2011). This 
process, as is well known, produces a hierarchical spectrum of constructed rational-
ity and irrationality (women and non-white people represent core examples of this 
problematic and longstanding ideological dynamic) (Smart 1989; Jaggar and Bordo 
1989, p. 4).
It is precisely this prioritization of the archetypal legal actor, sole possessor of 
the disembodied rationalism underpinning law’s imaginary of human embodiment, 
that gives rise to the need for the term ‘quasi-disembodiment’. The disembodiment 
1 Analogous to the ideological construction of legal individualism, on which, see Norrie (2001).
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imagined by Western philosophy and law is, of course, impossible for corporeally 
specific human beings, while core injustices of the legal imaginary are paradoxi-
cally dependent upon bodies and bodily ‘differences’, as we have seen. There is, as 
Ahmed has put it, a smuggled body in legal disembodiment (Ahmed 1995, p. 56): 
rationality is quintessentially disembodied (body-transcendent) yet rationality is also 
male; the female is immersed in embodiment as a source of unreason. To be recog-
nized as male requires a particular morphology: thus, the smuggled body of disem-
bodiment is inevitably male—a body ‘defined precisely through the mechanism of 
exclusion’ (1995, p. 56). Hence: quasi-disembodiment.
Quasi-disembodiment is a politics. It is an ideological process that systematically 
produces ‘others’ to the subject-at-the-centre of law’s imaginary. These ‘others’ are 
to differing degrees and varying contexts objectified (and feminized) by a body-pol-
itics of privilege and marginalization in which women, other non-dominant humans, 
non-human animals, ecosystems and a whole universe of lively ‘others’ are caught 
up in juridical processes of objectification.2
In this sense, quasi-disembodied embodiment is central to the injustices of the 
legal imaginary, which turn on significant patterns of marginalization precisely 
through the attribution of body-immersion/irrationality/objectification/feminization. 
Significantly, moreover, the apotheosis of the quasi-disembodied legal actor is the 
business corporation, which much more closely corresponds to the ideological and 
structural characteristics of law’s disembodied perspective and disembodied imagi-
nary than can any corporeally specific human being (Grear 2010, pp. 89-95). The 
business corporation is the jurally disembodied personification of capital (Neocle-
ous 2003), yet its submerged bodily imaginary is simultaneously Eurocentric, white, 
and masculinist (Lahey and Salter 1985; Federman 2003; Belcher 2011). Quasi-
disembodied rationality also operates as a central mechanism of Eurocentric civi-
lizational priority (Kapur 2007, p. 541). This, combined with the juridical privilege 
and disembodied advantages of the corporate body intensify the patterns of selective 
‘othering’ and the property-centred appropriative dynamics visible in the colonial 
capitalist drivers of the Anthropocene and foundational to the international legal 
order co-emergent with it (McLean 2004; Anghie 2005; Malm and Hornborg 2014). 
Arguably, the ultimate expression of the ideological and structural primacy of the 
quasi-disembodied subject is the transnational corporation (TNC), which was func-
tionally indispensible both to the colonial power structures underpinning the Euro-
centric international legal order (Mclean 2004; Anghie 2005; Malm and Hornborg 
2014), and to the mercantile and then corporate industrial origins of the colonial 
capitalist Anthropocene (Grear 2015).
As is well known, the ‘Anthropocene’ is the formally proposed title for a post-
Holocene geological epoch. The origins of the Anthropocene are contested (Glikson 
2 This objectification seems intrinsically related to the ‘flat’ surface of formal legal justice, which per-
forms an uneven and selective imposition of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ that ‘reduces the concrete-
ness of the other, minimises differences of need and desire, and emphasises similarities and homologies 
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2013; Foley et al. 2013), but critical accounts converge to expose broadly colonial 
capitalist origins (Malm and Hornborg 2014; Lewis and Maslin 2015; Kanngieser 
and Beuret 2017). Lewis and Maslin identify two primary geological markers 
(GSSPs) indicating its most likely start dates: 1610—and 1964. Significantly, the 
1610 GSSP marks the emergence of the modern colonial ‘world system’ (Lewis and 
Maslin 2015, p. 175), the marker itself being a significant dip in atmospheric  CO2, 
the so-called ‘Orbis spike’ (signalling the emergence of a unified world (‘orb’)). 
This was a time of a ‘geologically unprecedented homogenization of Earth’s biota’ 
(2015, p. 175) known as the ‘Colombian Exchange’, a cross-continental movement 
of plant and animal life—‘a swift, ongoing, radical reorganization of life on Earth 
without geological precedent’ (2015, p. 174). The dip in  CO2 was caused by the 
decimation of the human population of the ‘New World’ as it came into contact with 
European diseases, ‘war, enslavement and famine’ (2015, p. 175). Human numbers 
collapsed by some 50 million leading up to 1650: farming ceased, forests took over, 
and the resultant carbon sequestration stands in the geological record as a permanent 
marker of widespread death and devastation. Meanwhile, the 1964 ‘Great Accel-
eration’ marker reflects a significant increase in human numbers, decisive shifts in 
natural processes, and the development of pollutants such as plastics. As Connolly 
notes, the Great Acceleration has intensified markedly under the pressures of global 
capitalism, with capitalist states in the Global North increasingly being joined in the 
production of pollutants by more recent capitalist states, such as India, China, Brazil 
and Russia (Connolly 2017, Ch. 5).
The quasi-disembodied subject for which all ‘others’ were/are objectified/quasi-
objectified and whose appropriative ideology is operationalized through TNC plun-
der of the objectified world of still-colonized ‘others’ was—and remains—key to the 
production of the capitalist Anthropocene. Law of the Anthropocene is, therefore, 
law as coloniality and neo-coloniality—law complicit in ongoing forms of eco-vio-
lence, economic predation and the unparalleled imposition of precarity on humans 
and non-humans alike (Blanco and Grear 2019). The ‘global’ of the Anthropocene 
and of the globalized legal order was thus always ‘highly specific’ in its origins and 
development (Haraway 2014, 14.02) and the Anthropocene marks, to a significant 
degree, an intensification of trajectories inherent to the capitalist legal imaginary.
The imaginary of quasi-disembodiment and the severed rationalism that it erects 
as its epistemological panopticon3 is fundamental, then, to the predatory imaginary 
structuring the colonial past and the neocolonial present. As Kanngeiser and Bueret 
put it, the ‘Anthropocene is the outcome of five hundred years of dispossession, cap-
italist accumulation, and neo/colonial globalization’ (Kanngieser and Beuret 2017, 
p. 376). So marked are these patterns that some scholars rightly reject the implied 
species-ecumenism of the term ‘Anthropocene’, preferring ‘Capitalocene’ as a more 
accurate alternative (Moore 2016; Malm 2016).
The role of quasi-disembodiment in these patterns is central: law’s onto-epistemic 
imaginary is fundamentally shaped by it, and from this perspective it is predictable 
that, as McLean puts it, the ‘the history of colonial expansion is [also] a history of 
3 A term drawn from Jung (2007, p. 239).
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the corporate form’ (McLean 2004, p. 364). This is no historical accident. If, as 
Chakrabarty (2007, p. 4) has argued, the
entire phenomenon of ‘political modernity’, namely – the rule by modern 
institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise – is impossible 
to think of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and con-
cepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theologi-
cal traditions of Europe,
then these structures are in reality impossible to think of without also assuming 
(even without awareness of the fact) the longstanding body-politics of quasi-disem-
bodiment underwriting the juridical order. In this imaginary, only European men, 
after all, archetypally conform to the template of a fully ‘human’ legal subjectiv-
ity (Quijano and Ennis 2000): liberal law’s ‘[r]ights and benefits were tied to the 
capacity to reason, and the capacity to reason was tied to notions of biological deter-
minism, racial and religious superiority and civilizational maturity’ (Kapur 2007, p. 
541). Law’s imaginary thus constructed the colonial ‘inferiority of the colonized’ 
precisely by co-situating indigenous and colonized ‘others’ with all those other less-
than-fully-rational (feminized—non-White-male-body-identified) ‘others’ to the 
‘rational’ quasi-disembodied European master-subject.
In short, the predictable, familiar mal-distributions of life and death currently 
characterizing the Anthropocene draw upon the same onto-epistemic imaginary as 
underpins a long history of Eurocentric, masculinist, colonizing power (Adelman 
2015) and its prototypical rational, ‘civilizing’ actor. The imaginary of law of the 
Anthropocene is then an imaginary foundational to what is now a necrocapital-
ist (Banerjee 2008) catastrophe. The stakes are profound. In Catastrophic Times, 
Stengers reminds her readers that human beings face, potentially, ‘the death of what 
we have called a civilization [– and she reminds us –] there are many manners of 
dying, some being more ugly than others’ (Stengers 2015, p. 10). Even in death, 
law’s capitalistic body-politics operates as what Mbembe calls ‘necropolitics’—the 
kind of politics that subjects life unevenly to ‘the power of death’ (Mbembe 2003). 
Where, then, might hope of an alternative imaginary, with different potentialities, 
lie?
Legal Imaginary for the Anthropocene
Plumwood captures the challenge presented by such catastrophic prospects—and 
drives at the radical nature of the transformations of human consciousness and 
praxis now necessary. She accurately diagnoses the kind of failure that consigns the 
future to deadly outcomes: ‘If our species does not survive the ecological crisis, it 
will probably be due to our failure… to work out new ways to live with the earth, to 
rework ourselves… We will go onwards in a different mode of humanity, or not at 
all’ (Plumwood 2007, p. 1). It is this ‘going onwards in a different mode of human-
ity’ and the need to ‘rework ourselves’ in new arts of living with the Earth that are 
centrally at stake in seeking an alternative legal imaginary for the Anthropocene.
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As noted above, replacing an existing imaginary is always more than ‘a matter 
of appealing to considerations of truth or falsity. It involves encounters with alter-
native imagined configurations which can be recognized as making both cognitive 
and affective sense’ (Lennon 2004, pp. 107; 111). How, in the light of this, might 
humans ‘go onwards in a different mode of humanity’? And with what implications 
for how law is imagined? In this segment of this paper, I bring together some schol-
arship pointing towards alternative imaginaries of both embodiment and world.
First, in response to the reductionism of the body to ‘mere matter’ in the onto-
epistemic foundations of the legal imaginary of the Anthropocene, I turn first to an 
account transforming matter itself into a lively, agentic field of significance. Ben-
nett, in her book Vibrant Matter, presents an argument supporting the idea that all 
matter—including inorganic matter and the artefactual—is lively and agentic in the 
broad sense that there is a ‘capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, met-
als—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act 
as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities or tendencies of their own’ 
(Bennett 2010, Kindle Location (KinLoc.) 72–73). Bennett’s aim is precisely to 
transform the perceptual, and to provide ‘a style of political analysis that can bet-
ter account for the contributions of nonhuman actants’ (2010, KinLoc. 108–109)—a 
move that brings to life the inert field of matter—‘dead res extensa’ (Weber 2013, 
p. 14)—assumed by law’s existing imaginary. It is not, if we take Bennett’s position, 
the disembodied rational subject whose panoptic ‘knowledge’ and ‘agency’ alone 
counts, because non-subjects also have ‘active powers’ (2010, KinLoc. 87–88), 
powers to which humans (and law) can become ‘perceptually open’ (2010, KinLoc. 
553–554).
Bennett offers an important step towards displacing the legal imaginary of the 
Anthropocene precisely because she opens out ‘an alternative to the object as a way 
of encountering the nonhuman world’ (2010, KinLoc. 231, emphasis added). This is 
also much more than a merely cognitive shift—itself necessitated by developments 
in science revealing the agentic liveliness of matter (Barad 2007) and the ontologi-
cal and intellectual impossibility (Haraway 2014, 02.20)4 of the subject-object rela-
tions assumed by law. The perceptual shift involved here is unmistakably affective. 
It invites an embodied, perceptual openness to matter’s independent powers and a 
perceptual encounter with the fact that matter is ‘much more variable and creative 
than we ever imagined’ (Bennett 2010, KinLoc. 402). Matter emerges on Bennett’s 
account as, borrowing the words of Massumi, a ‘pressing crowd of incipiencies and 
tendencies’ (2010, KinLoc. 1282).5
This shift, faithful to new scientific evidence, repositions the locus of agency, 
which now, rather than being the sole possession of the ‘rational’ subject, is dis-
tributed—is ‘always a human–nonhuman working group’ (2010, KinLoc. 236–237). 
This is an imaginary in which the ‘human’ is no longer ‘central’ but emphatically 
4 Haraway argues that the revolution in the natural sciences has made ‘individualism, methodological 
individualism and human exceptionalism’ now ‘literally unthinkable’; and has revealed that the ‘tissues 
of being anything at all’ demand recognition ‘that those who are have been in relationality all the way 
down’.
5 Citing Latham and McCormick (2004, p. 705), who cite Massumi (2002, p. 30).
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in-the-midst-of a tumult of flows and forces. One of these forces, ‘the planetary’, 
which is highly pertinent to an imaginary of law for the Anthropocene, is introduced 
by Connolly as an agentic crowd of ‘temporal force fields’
such as climate patterns, drought zones, the ocean conveyor system, species 
evolution, glacier flows, and hurricanes that exhibit self-organizing capacities 
to varying degrees and that impinge upon each other and human life in numer-
ous ways. … Planetary forces have been marked by gradual change periodi-
cally punctuated themselves by rather rapid changes. To face the planetary 
today is to encounter these processes in their multiple intersections and peri-
ods of volatility. (Connolly 2017, p. 4)
Connolly offers a lively planetary agency further disrupting the assumed centrality 
of law’s quasi-disembodied agent-at-the-centre. Connolly argues that the Anthro-
pocene is a fateful convergence between industrial capitalism (in particular) and 
the forces of the planetary—and is not just the product of human social forces. He 
argues that these ‘two forces [(industrial capitalism and the planetary)] together 
make the contemporary condition more volatile and dangerous than it would be if 
only the first were involved’ (2017, p. 4). The planetary itself is an agentic force—
and any legal imaginary for the Anthropocene needs to embrace this or fail to 
respond to the immense depth of what is at stake. The sociocentrism involved in 
assuming that human forces alone triggered the Anthropocene, Connolly notes, is 
‘…bound to notions of human exceptionalism and nature as a deposit of resources 
to use and master; in it humans are treated as the only entitled agents in the world’ 
(2017, p. 16). The planetary, brought into the frame, produces an imaginary of the 
body—of all bodies—as co-situated in an unpredictable assemblage of ‘bumpy’ 
planetary forces and temporalities that pre-existed industrial capitalist processes and 
impacts. Such an imaginary demands a radical epistemic and ontological humility: 
no Promethean agency for the human—just agentic entanglement with a planetary 
field of radically distributed, multiplicitous agentic forces, some of which (many of 
which) are entirely unlike their imaginary structure in the existing juridical order.
Re-visioning ‘human’ bodies as affective, affectable assemblages entangled in a 
lively world of matter’s own incipiencies demands fresh attention to kinds of rela-
tionality often occluded by the imaginary of disembodied rationality. The bounded 
nature of the body-self assumed by law (Nedelsky 1990) is thrown up against its 
own empirical impossibility—for bodies really are lively, porous, membranous cir-
cuits exhibiting a natal openness to/with ‘the world’.
An Anthropocene-sensitive imaginary of embodiment foregrounds the need to 
attend to dangerous material conditions, wild enormities, multiplicitous micro-agen-
cies, and an entire planetary flurry of forces drifting, seeping, and transiting through 
and across bodies and worlds. In Bodily Natures: Science, Environment and the 
Material Self, Alaimo brings together embodiment, materiality, interconnection and 
toxicity to argue that the context for ethics is the ‘emergent, ultimately unmappable 
landscapes of interacting biological, climatic, economic and political forces’ of the 
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contemporary planetary condition (Alaimo 2010, p. 2). She offers a new mode of 
encounter calling on a very different kind of imaginary of embodiment from that of 
the relatively sealed, bounded, disembodied actor of law: ‘trans-corporeality’. Trans-
corporeality invites, says Alaimo, a ‘thinking’ and a ‘movement across bodies’—
multiple bodies: ‘human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, chemical 
agents, and other actors’ (2010, p. 2). Trans-corporeal analyses trace ‘entangled ter-
ritories of material and discursive, natural and cultural, biological and textual’ (2010, 
p. 3), producing an epistemic-ethical strategy bringing precise attention to differing 
kinds of transits across multiple bodies. This ‘thinking across bodies’ has the poten-
tial to open law’s imaginary to a much more capacious epistemic imaginary, but also 
instigates a more open-ended ethical attentiveness, precisely because trans-corporeal 
transits are caught up with ‘regulatory failures, environmental degradation and pat-
terns of social injustice’ (2010, p. 15). Alaimo’s transcorporeal imaginary implies a 
non-negotiable need for a new knowledge imaginary, because it ‘ruptures ordinary 
knowledge practices’ and because there are ‘particular moments of confusion and 
contestation that occur when individuals and collectives must contend not only with 
the materiality of their very selves but with the often invisibly hazardous landscapes 
of risk society’ (2010, p. 17). The often invisibly hazardous landscapes of risk and 
toxicity characterizing the Anthropocene, in short, ‘erode even our most sophisticated 
modes of understanding’ (2010, p. 17). This imaginary renders explicit the need to 
rely on the sensory organ of science to open human perception (and thus, law) to 
what is not visible to the unaided human eye (2010, p. 19). Just as Bennett insists that 
many movements of matter escape unaided human perception, so Alaimo argues that 
scientific sensing, in an age of transcorporeal toxicities, is now a pre-requisite even 
for ‘survey[ing] the landscape of the self’ (2010, p. 19).
An alternative imaginary of entangled embodiment—porous, and immersed in 
complex macro- and micro-transits—emphasizes another implication of such schol-
arship and the science it draws upon, which is that, as Bennett puts it, ‘all bodies are 
kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations’ (Bennett 
2010, KinLoc. 510–511). Haraway locates such dense networks explicitly against the 
background imaginary of the Anthropocene in her book Staying with the Trouble: 
Making Kin in the Chthulucene—actively tracing the arcs of injustice and patterned 
distributions of life and death in the ‘Anthropocene–Capitalocene–Plantationo-
cene’ and presenting a passionate case for an alternative imaginary: the ‘Chthulu-
cene’ (Haraway 2016). Haraway, like Bennett and Alaimo, emphasizes the porous, 
intercorporeal entanglement of complex interacting energies and agentic forces at 
all scales. Her work signals the sheer, complex multiplicity of connections at stake, 
and without downplaying the sense in which everything is ultimately connected, she 
points to the specificity of ethical connection: ‘nothing is connected to everything; 
everything is connected to something’, and the ‘specificity and proximity of connec-
tions matters—who we are bound up with and in what ways’ (2016, p. 31, fn. 2).6
The profoundly ethical question of who we are bound up with in what 
ways, it seems to me, must sit at the heart of any new imaginary for laws for the 
6 Emphasis original, citing van Dooren (2014, p. 60).
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Anthropocene. It matters how humans and non-human critters of all kinds—organic 
and inorganic—are understood to be bound up with each other, and in what respects 
and ways—and these specific patterns of interwovenness can and should be made 
visible to questions of juridical justice/injustice. In the legal imaginary of the 
Anthropocene, patterns of affect were narrowly constructed along reductive causal 
lines notoriously inept for climate-related harms (harms which are, when all is said 
and done, intrinsically transcorporeal). In the legal imaginary of the Anthropocene, 
juridical rationality and its disembodied individualism operates (albeit complexly 
and incompletely) to excise eco-social context (Norrie 2001) and entanglement 
selectively from view, while matter is, as we have seen, reduced to a field of objec-
tified exploitability closely related to the objectifying spectrum along which law’s 
‘others’ are ranged.
In a legal imaginary for the Anthropocene, inspired by new imaginaries of lively, 
porous embodiment and of Earthly materialities expressing their own incipien-
cies and tendencies, the onto-epistemic frame opens expansively. Into the direct 
purview of questions of justice, injustice and ethics come the jostling propensi-
ties and capacities of organic and inorganic forms of liveliness. Such an imaginary 
could bring law closer to Haraway’s Chthulucene, in so far as it could open law and 
legal enquiry to the ways in which ‘we’ are bound up with each other in multiple 
ways through threads of entangled affect at macro, meso and micro levels. Mini-
mally, legal enquiry would need to expand epistemologically, and as noted above, 
lean into the sensory organs of science without which ethical sight is too shallow to 
account for transcorporeal realities. However, such an imaginary should also, I sug-
gest, mean opening law, and certainly opening legal theoretical work, to the sensory 
organs of the arts—with their unique capacity to dislodge and to re-invent imaginar-
ies, their unrivalled ability—along with plural indigenous lifeways (Escobar, 2015) 
and practices of spirituality as technologies of the self—to transform the lived-sense 
of ‘I’/‘other’. Indeed, Haraway’s work is rich with implication in this respect.
Space only allows a brief consideration. I therefore focus on one particular thread. 
I suggest that Haraway’s Chthulucene imaginary inspires the possibility of what 
might be termed ‘sympoietic normativities’. Such normativities (and art-science col-
laborations exploring their meaning) should become central, I suggest, to grounding 
a renewing legal imaginary for the Anthropocene.
For Haraway, sympoiesis is a corrective to ‘autopoiesis’ (the capacity of organ-
isms to self-produce: ‘organisms … viewed as… materially embodied processes 
that bring forth themselves’ (Weber 2013, p. 30, emphasis added). Haraway pre-
fers sympoiesis because it emphasizes the idea of the co- and sym-productive 
nature of materially embodied processes. Indeed, she argues that sympoietic sys-
tems are often mistaken for autopoietic ones, and that
this point is important for thinking about rehabilitation (making liveable 
again) and sustainability amid the porous tissues and open edges of dam-
aged but still ongoing living worlds, like the planet earth and its denizens in 
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collectively-producing systems that do not have self-defined spatial or tem-
poral boundaries. Information and control are distributed among compo-
nents. The systems are evolutionary and have the potential for surprising 
change. (Haraway 2016, p. 33, citing Dempster 1998)
Given that science and philosophy no longer support even the plausibility of 
‘independent organisms in environments’ (Haraway 2016, p. 33), sympoiesis—
which moves far beyond interacting units plus contexts and rules—emphasizes 
the membranous, porous nature of system-entanglements and the inherently co-
relational nature of emergence. Sympoiesis thus offers, I think, rich possibili-
ties for the future theorization of a legal imaginary for the Anthropocene and a 
renewing ground for normative relationalities.
As Haraway puts it, ‘Sympoiesis is a simple word: it means “making with” 
… Sympoiesis is a word proper to complex, dynamic, responsive, situated, his-
torical systems. It is a word for worlding-with, in company. Sympoiesis enfolds 
autopoiesis and generatively unfurls and extends it’ (Haraway 2016, p. 58). We 
should pause here to note that an imaginary of sympoietic embodiment sounds a 
death knell to the human exceptionalism and individualism underwriting law: a 
sympoietic entity is a ‘holobiont’—not a ‘one’ or ‘individual’:
in polytemporal, polyspatial knottings, holobionts hold together contin-
gently and dynamically, engaging other holobionts in complex patternings. 
Critters do not precede their relatings; they make each other through semi-
otic material involution, out of the beings of previous such entanglements. 
(Haraway 2016, p. 60)
Both cognitively and affectively the imaginary of embodiment becomes a 
space of holobiont relationalities—even the human body is not straightforwardly 
‘human’ in the sense that the human body is also in large part a complex, shift-
ing and contingent community of microbiota, viruses and other tiny non-human 
holobionts.
What might sympoietic normativities look like? First, they would not look, I 
suspect, like ambitious and ‘overarching’ aspirations for Earth System law/gov-
ernance in the Anthropocene, though this is not to deny that such aspirations 
could possibly evolve into Chthulucene formations were they to make a consist-
ent and radical enough onto-epistemic shift away from their generic sociocen-
trism. ‘Overarching’ juridical schemes are perhaps best replaced by an imaginary 
of dynamic, complex, lively, emergent normativities for which law could protect/
respect spaces of operation and expression. For example, sympoietic normativi-
ties could arise out of human–non-human working groups in a wide range of situ-
ated endeavours in commons-based, grassroots initiatives, expanded to embrace 
‘commoners’ who are more-than-simply-human (Grear 2020, forthcoming). Sym-
poietic normativities could hold out space for co-negotiation; for warm, secure 
embrace of contingency and struggle, while practicing open, compassionately-
critical awareness of the need to question what counts and for whom (human and 
non-human), in what ways, and why. Such a normative imaginary embraces new 
ways of knowing, not from ‘a centre’ or from a privileged systemic height, but 
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from in the midst of the ‘graspings, frayings, and weavings, passing relays again 
and again, in the generative recursions that make up living and dying’ (Haraway 
2016, p. 33). It simultaneously invites into the frame the multiple indigenous nor-
mativities of the ‘pluriverse’ (Escobar 2015). It invites a tentacular epistemic sen-
sitivity (through the sensory organs of science, arts, indigenous life-world story-
ing and multiple other such epistemic inputs) to ‘shifting states and capacities, 
which in turn produce further shifting states and capacities in a non-linear, rhizo-
matic way that spreads out in all directions sometimes in patterned ways, some-
times unpredictably’ (Grear 2017, p. 23) and which make up particular, situated 
patterns of justice and injustice. Groups and communities (imagined as symbi-
ont clusterings) could form evolutive sympoietic partnerships across and between 
groups, generating new normative formations and praxes.
Haraway focuses on what she calls ‘engaged science art activist worldings com-
mitted to partial healing, modest rehabilitation, and still possible resurgence in the 
hard times of the imperial Anthropocene–Capitalocene’ (Haraway 2016, p. 71). One 
of the projects she uses to illustrate such worldings is the Crochet Coral Reef project 
(Haraway 2016, pp. 76–81). After introducing the centrality of coral reefs to both 
biotic survival and to the awareness (because of their dying) leading to the iden-
tification of the Anthropocene, Haraway introduces the sensory imaginarium of a 
project that draws together mathematics and crafting and a sprawling world-wide 
weaving process bringing to life the significance of corals to a wide audience. In this 
project, crochet is a dynamic tool for making ‘a physical model of hyperbolic space 
that allows us to feel, and to tacitly explore the properties of [the coral’s] unique 
geometry’ (Haraway 2016, p. 76).
Fighting for the survival and flourishing of coral reefs in this way began with a 
phrase passed between two sisters: ‘we should crochet a coral reef’ (2016, p. 76). 
This apparently quotidian starting point opened up a whole world of possibilities 
and insights. The coral reef project unfolds, with iteratively added contributions and 
diverse directions taken, to produce ‘probably the world’s largest collaborative art 
project’ (Haraway 2016, p. 78).
The involutionary momentum of the crochet coral reef powers the sympoietic 
knotting of mathematics, marine biology, environmental activism, ecological 
consciousness raising, women’s handicrafts, fiber arts, museum display, and 
community art practices. (Haraway 2016, p. 78)
The open-ended, collaborative, critical–creative nature of this process in which 
thousands of humans and non-humans alike are threaded together, reflects the kind 
of sensing creativities visible in multitudinous commons-formations all over the 
world. It has more than passing resonance with what happens when communities 
come together in multiple geo-physically located and digital initiatives and partner-
ships to co-compose alternative, organic normative relations, indigenous and non-
indigenous alike (Bollier and Helfrich 2015). Future normative imaginaries reflect-
ing multi-fibred connections between humans and non-humans of a wide range of 
kinds in such projects (particularly when ‘visioned’ next to the coral reef project), 
hold out rich potential for sympoietic normativities to be generatively co-produced 
by a wide range of communities (human–non-human), disciplines, and arts of living, 
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shaping a distinctively Anthropocene-facing ‘aesthesis of obligation’ (Matthews 
2019). The fundamental and welcome ‘wildness’ of such projects (they seem to 
brim over, rather than be tightly operatively constrained) links them, too, to forms of 
critical–creative activism such as the ‘politics of swarming’ that Connolly suggests 
as a response to Anthropocene planetary injustices (Connolly 2017), and emergent 
in multiple indigenous and other protest mobilizations against colonizing neoliberal 
petro-capitalism, climate injustice and long-standing racial hierarchies.
Law’s role here, rather than being seen as ‘overarching’, might more usefully be 
seen as the responsive guardianship of emergent spaces of interdependent, commu-
nicative normativities, perhaps even protecting them through the formation of a right 
to commons-based human–non-human co-governance. Of course, such theoretical 
imaginings of new forms of normative intimacy as well as the kind of ‘intimacy 
without proximity’ (Haraway 2016, p. 79) expressed by the coral reef project and 
by digital commons, seem fundamentally alien to the dominant legal imaginary—
despite the fact the contemporary age is marked by intensifying levels of inter-legal-
ity and by ever more porous intersections between orders of norms. The apparently 
alien-to-law nature of this alternative legal imaginary, perhaps, resides precisely in 
its underlying onto-epistemic capaciousness and in its radical commitment to new 
forms of critical–creative-distributed care for Earth in forms of anti-objectification.
The imaginary disembodiment of law’s colonial capitalist subject-at-the-centre 
produces an order of top-down ‘human action’ upon ‘matter’ as extensa and total-
izing juridical aspirations that still assume a pervasive, selective anthropocentrism/
sociocentrism. The imaginary embodiment traced by the vibrancy of matter; by the 
visible/invisible chosen/unchosen intimacies of transcorporeality; and by human 
entanglements with bumpy planetary energies, signals a very different set of rela-
tionalities—not a ‘global’ project or an aspirational juridical holism, but a vision 
responsive to Haraway’s invitation—more realistic, humble and earthy than the 
old juridical fantasies of overarching human agentic force and Promethean law—to 
‘stay with the trouble’—to commit to ongoingness—to sink into the messy, critterly 
‘graspings, frayings, and weavings, passing relays again and again, in the genera-
tive recursions that make up living and dying’ (Haraway 2016, p. 33). Sympoietic 
normativities ultimately ground this ongoingness—the call to normatively inclusive 
world-making—to co-world a world of worlds —the kind of sympoietic world-mak-
ing without which liveable worlds are unlikely to thrive.
Haraway rightly argues that it matters ‘what ideas we use to think other ideas’ 
(2016, p. 34). The imaginary of the body as disembodied—and the objectified world 
of objectified others in the foundations of the colonial Anthropocene legal order 
demonstrates, amply, the catastrophic implications of the ideas thinking those ideas. 
Thinking-with the body as lively materiality; thinking-with transcorporeally; think-
ing-with sympoiesis—these invite very different ideas into view. A central impli-
cation—difficult for lawyers to imagine perhaps—is that no longer is the ‘human’ 
(especially ‘the human’ of liberal coloniality) the only actor in the world whose 
agency counts. Nor is humanity the centre of the story. This alternative imaginary 
invites law to respond to the fact that, as De Landa puts it, ‘matter has morphoge-
netic capacities of its own and does not need to be commanded into a generating 
form’ (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, p. 43). The story has shifted. ‘The order is 
364 A. Grear 
1 3
reknitted: human beings are with and of the earth, and the biotic and abiotic powers 
of this earth are the main story’ now (Haraway 2016, p. 55).
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